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application" (p. 275). Against this view some effective retorts are made, but I should hardly believe that what he attacks would be commonly defended to-day. The existence of, or at any rate possibility of, temporary, recurrent tendencies toward "over-production" would, I imagine, be generally admitted, but at the same time countervailing tendencies to under-production would be pointed to. The one, it would be held by the "orthodox," is no more to be regarded as a general tendency than the other. Progress appears to take place by these curious spasms and reactions; and the evil that they occasion incidentally cannot be disguised. But I should argue that it is not established that production has outrun consumption, and that every invention is widening the gap. To prove it you must prove either that demand is already fully satisfied, or that organizing power is practically inelastic, its supply being unaffected by the promise of gain. And if all classes were satiated with the wealth which existing incomes represented, as indeed they are not, then earnings and the hours of labor being intimately connected, further progress would mean commensurate curtailment of the proportion of the day devoted to production.

That full justice has not been done here to Mr. Hobson's dialectics must be admitted, but the limitations of space must be allowed as excuse. 'We have indicated merely the lines upon which we should make reply. It is unfortunate too, that where there is so much with which we are in agreement, attention should have been drawn mainly to points in dispute. But it is only fair to the seriousness of Mr. Hobson's work that this should have been done. In view of the author's repute it is almost unnecessary to add that the book is a valuable, as well as challenging, contribution to economic literature.

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RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By W. R. Boyce Gibson. Lecturer on Philosophy in the University of London. London: Adam and Charles Black.

There are numerous indications in this little book of the author's whole-hearted enthusiasm for his subject. In a sentence, possessing more than one interesting feature, Eucken's doctrine is referred to as "a scheme of truth which in a very

genuine sense of the term will be the philosophy of the future, if the future proves worthy of it."

The doctrine thus hopefully spoken of is variously named as the "new idealism," "personal idealism," "religious idealism," or still more specifically "Christian idealism." On its negative side it is a protest against naturalism on the one hand and abstract intellectualism on the other. In its positive aspect it claims to sublate both by a view which is at once concrete and idealistic. Starting with the assumption that experience may be arranged in ascending stages or levels, the sensuous, the subjective, and the spiritual, it insists, in terms of this that only in the life of action on the highest stage do we come adequately into contact with truth and reality. The riddle of the universe is not to be solved by the man of science in his laboratory dealing with sense phenomena, nor by the merely logical thinker in his study neatly arranging a conceptual system, but by him who lives a life of heroic spiritual activity.

It is explicitly announced that the first questions of philosophy are addressed not to the speculative intellect, but to the personality as a whole. Truth is spoken of as "a personal ideal." The test is neither to be found in clearness and distinctness of ideas, nor in the correspondence of thought with an external reality, nor in systematic coherence; we shall only find it in "spiritual fruitfulness as inwardly realized by the personal experient, inwardly realized as springing freshly and freely from the inexhaustible resources which our freedom gains from its dependence upon God."

Eucken lays stress on the fact that only within a given realm of experience can we find the principles of its explanation. Naturalism, for instance, breaks down when it passes beyond the sphere of sense and attempts to apply its categories to ethical and religious experiences which are in the domain of spirit. We must start from that experience itself, from a spiritual immediacy which is at best as valid as sense immediacy. But in the one case, as in the other, we must make out the explanation, lay bare the rational structure of the process which, though implicit in it, is not immediately "given." This seems peculiarly the philosopher's business.

Now when we come to look for Eucken's theory of spiritual experience, for the "speculative basis" which he asserts he has furnished, we meet with but small satisfaction. The spiritual

life gets its supreme worth and validity through this coming here into immediate touch with the Divine. We are immediately aware of this contact, and at the same time are aware of our own freedom and of the inviolate nature of our own personality. How are we to relate and connect these convictions? How explain the possibility of a truly free personality which is at the same time utterly dependent upon the all-supporting spirit which gives to it the significance and value it possesses? These questions seem vital to Eucken in a philosophical regard. He meets them by renouncing the possibility of theory, and refers the questioner to the very experience which he is seeking to explain. These are simply fundamental convictions which defy explanation, but which the truly spiritual life will verify and attest. This is distinctly discouraging to that form of "heroic spiritual activity" in which men strive after the clear understanding of experience. Those upon whom this burden is laid are not likely to gain much from Eucken's "Philosophy of Life." For such the *solvitur in ambulando* formula, worthy and even, as here, inspiring in its own sphere, has hitherto proved but an empty spell, and we do not share Mr. Boyce Gibson's expectation that it may be otherwise in time to come.

Mr. Gibson's exposition was originally given as a series of lectures, and in point of form the book suffers manifestly from the circumstances of its origin. In spirit and tone, however, it is attractive, and the reader can hardly fail to be favorably impressed by the competence of the author for his task, both in the matter of zeal and of knowledge.

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POETRY AND THE INDIVIDUAL. By Hartley B. Alexander. New York: Putnams, 1906. Pp. vii, 233.

Mr. Alexander seeks, in this delightful essay, to analyze the imaginative life in the department of human thought in which the idealizing motive is most manifest, namely, in the poetic instinct, the chief of the "arts," the most perfect expression of beauty. He believes that we need a sort of rebaptism of the Platonic spirit in a *humanization* of our philosophical interests, and writes this essay as a corroboration of the claims of beauty to measure the worth of life.